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PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT
William P. Lyons
-"The true test of civilization is, not
the census, nor the size of cities, nor
the crops - no, but the kirul of man
the country tllrns out." (Ralph Waldo
Emerson, Society and Solitude1 )

INTRODUCTION
War is like a ganl(' of clH'ss. It is a
(·ont(,lItioll I)('tw('('n two or mort'
States, through their armed forces, for
the purposes of overpowering each
other and imposing such conditions of
peace as the victor pleases. War is a
fact recognizcd, and with regard to
many points rrgulated, but not esta·
)'IiFllt'o hy intt'rnational law. Its pur·
pnSt' is tI) <1t'sl roy or n'move Illl'
('Iwmy's will or lIIt'ans 10 fight. In dlt'SS
WI' render impOh'nt or capture sufficient of ih"e opponent's pieces to force
his king into a position from which the
only escape is capture. In war we follow the same pattern; we destroy or
capture his means to fight, his men and
material, and force his leaders into
a position from which the only outlets
are death or surrender. Our opponent
is, of course, striving to do the same.
"If there be war, let it be in my
time, that my children may have
peace.":! Th!'se words by Thomas Paine

should he the slogan of every adult
American male today. We do 110t want
war, but war is as old as the world,
and records of it are found throughout
the human race. It will never cease to
demand consideration if we draw our
conclusions from past events and the
nns!'ttled conditions at present. The nuckar age and wars of national liberation hayt' in thrmselvt's added a new
perspective to armed conflict.
During the hysteria of war there is
no more helpless and appealing figure
than that of a prisoner of war.
Figl;ling 1111'n spl'ak of "tht, fortlllll's of
wm." and dt'dare that it is lIt'ithl'r
dishonorable nor heroic to he takt'll
prisoner. In combat, luck cannot smilt'
on all participants, ann some art' hound
Lo lose. Thl' man lakl'll ('aptive is one of
the unlucky-a soldier of misfortllll!'.
Because he is at the mercy of the
dt'taining belligerent, the prisoner is
suhjrcted to many deprivations and
hardships. Often he is trrated crudly,
sometimes hy physical means and at
other times hy more suhtle psychological techniques. Ont' thing is dear,
howeyer; cruelty is no mOllopoly of Ihe
past. TIll' 20th century has horne witII!'SS to such treatment of the helpless
prisoner aF would have made many
"oleler harharisms appt'ar mild hy ('om-
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parison. Atroc-ities hav(' not he!'n inlPrmitt!'nt and casual, as they spring both
from the sadism of individuals and
from a conscious group system which
actively rejects, subverts, and destroys
standards of conduct and aims at degrading human values. In hardly any
war has the lot of the prisoner of
war been a happy one. In almost every
war, criminal individuals and cruel
governments have added to the misery
of helpless people who are at their
mercy.
Let no one be misled. As it so
aptly put in the ninth verse of the
fourth chapter of Lamentations, "They
that he slain by the sword are bcttcr
off than they that be slain with hunger." Death on the battlefield is far better than the slow death of an enemy
prison camp.
Americans have participated in many
wars, and many American have become
prisoners of war. Most have survived
- and most have survived with honor.
With very few cxc!'ptions the standards
of the American fighting man have
r!'mained unchallenged.
This pap!'r proposes to inv!'stigate
thoroughly tl\(· Code of Conc!lIC't for the
U.S. Al"m!'1i Fon'!'s ano its J"(·l:ttion to
pri,;om'rs of war. It is hop('d thnt
through this res('arch. uns\\"ers to the
following questions can be formulated:
Dol'S a nce-o exist for a Code? Ano if
so, dol'S till' pn'sl'lii Code fulfill that
need?
It has heen over 11. years since
Preside-nt Eisenhowe-r i!isue-d his Exe-cutive Order pre-scribing the Code of
Conduct for all members of the Armed
Forces. Since that time there ha!i heen
little cause or little opportunity to consid!'r the e-ffl'cl of the- Code within the
military estahlishml'nt. Today, ill yie-\\"
of th!' Unite-Ii States im'oh-('m('nt in
South('ast Asia, it se-l'lllS timdy to ('xamine the- Codl' ill light of its intl'lItions
and its accomplishml'nts.

I - STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR THE
FIGHTING MAN
Background. In time of peare- the
rights of belligerents should he secur('d
hy such agret'mrnts as are likdy to hr
followrd in time of war. As such, military cOin-entions are efficient, human
ways of introducing in thr miclst of
war as much Illllmlllnrss as possihh· in
thr relations of two or morr hrlli~e-r
e-nts. They in themselvrs do not furnish all thl' answers, but thry servr as
logical guides for those s('eking further
solutions to the al!e--old prohlrm of
human rights unci suffering clming
pe-riods of turmoil. .The srntimrnts of
humanity ha\:r also found a pla!'(' in
tl1(' relationship of hl'lligerrnts with
each other in the form of these international agreements and have had a
wholesome effect on the care and treatment of prisoners of war.
In 1907 the Hague Regulations estahlished rulcs prrtaining to captidty
in war. These regulations led to thl'
Gl'ne\'a COlln'ntions of 1929 anel 1919
whirh set forth in detail thr ri~hts and
protp('tions which sholllcl II(' affnrcll'd
prison!'rs. Th(,)" do not spc'('ilic'ally pn'~('ril1(' till' concluet whit'll a nation may
n'quirp of its pcrsonnrl who may hl'('oml' prisoners. ho\\'e-\'rr. as thi:; is
ri~ht fully h'ft to thl' c1i!'c'J"(!tion of the
sO\'('n'ign pO\\'l'r.
To cli:;c'ounlg(' cl!'sl'rtion cluring the
\{I'\·olution. thC' United Statrs estahlished tlw drath penalty for those
prisoners \\'ho, after capture, took up
arms in the- sen'ice of the enemy.
Duress or coercion was recognized as
mitigating only in event of thrratened
imm('diate' dcath. This was the first
American drfinitioll of rrquired prison1
PI" ('onduet.
Til thl' Trraty of 17R5
h(,tw('!'n til(' Unitl'd StatC's anel Prussia.
artic'h· XXIV pro\'ic!es furthc'r evidl'nc'l'
of a growing concern for prisoners of
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war.:! No standard of conduct was pre·
RrrillC'd. hut rOlI<1itions of confinrment,
l'an'. and paroll' wl're outlined.
Durin/! thr Civil War ahout 3,170
F('drrals hrld hy the South joined the
Southern Armirs and 5,452 prisoners
from the South joined the Federal
Army.:!
Prisoner conduct after capture was
Jl1I'ntionC'C1 in War Department Gl'neral
Ordl'r No. 207.:~ July lR6a. which pro·
\'ilhl. :tmonl! otllt'r thinl!~. that it was
tIll' duty of a ]lri~OIH'r of war to escapl'.
Pro~rcution for misconduct was based
on thrre criteria: 4
-miRronduct whrrl' there is no
dur!':o;s or !:I)('rdon.
-artive partiripation in combat
a~ainst F!'dpral fon'l's.
-failure to return voluntarily.
Nine years after the Civil War, a
dl'claration establishing the rights of
pril'oners was drafted by the Congress
of nrussels (1874.). It was signed by
] 5 nationR, nonr of which ratified it.a
Thl' "ast numhl'l' of pl'l'sons who arc
takl'll prisolll'1's of war makl'S the mat·
ter of handling them properly a mat·
trr of p:reat importancr. More than
:~O().ooo WI'I'I' ('apturl't1 durill/! tIll' war
of 1Il711-71; ahlml lIl().I)(11l durin/! 1111'
Turl'o·Prussian stru::rglrs and Busso·
Japam'sl' War. During World War J
the United States captured tl8,976
Gl'1'lJlans while 4,120 American soldil'rs
WI'fe captured." In World War II the
1I1litrd States was opposl'd hy Japan,
a nation which had not hecn a signa·
tory to the Grneva Conventions. While
the Japanese madr a token show of
following the accepted Conventions,
tIll' figures show the grim results. Of
soml' 17,000 Americans who sun'en·
dered on nataan and Corregidor, only
a mere 5,000 livrd through the 3%
yrars of ca}>ti\'it)'.7 A total of 129,701
Amrricans wrre captured hl' the Axis
enemy, and of thesr 14,090 died in
the I'Ill'my's prison camps.s

The Combatant and the Cap.
tive. One of the major worries plagu.
ing military personnel, should they he·
come prisoners of war, is that' of the
relationship between military responsi.
hility and personal survival. Survival
in prisoner·of.war camps may involve
instinctual rather than rational be·
havior, There is no other situation in
the world where human association
produces a greater possihility of inhu·
mane treatment of man hy his fellow:
man.!! Regardless of the circumstancrs,
upon military personnel, the drfrnders
of order. restR a 11('avy reRponsihility.
The grt'all'st sl'rvil'l' thl'y ('an rl'IIlII'f
as prisoners is to remain true to tllC'm·
selves and to serve with sill'nce and
courage 'in tht' military way.
The services may ha\'l' the crt'am of
Amrrican manhood, hut, at hest, this
is a cross section of Ihl' communities
of the nation, The sl'rvires can only
hope to inculcale and rt'new in the
American fighting man thl' dl'sire to
live his life on the hattlefield and in the
prison camps, if nere~<;ary. in such a
way Ihat whall'\'rr hap]l('l\>, hI' can hr
self.respecting and free of guilt.
Whl'n an illlii\'icillni nCl'l'pts lht'
duty to hI' a Illl'mhl'r of the Arll1rd
Forcrs of thr Unill'd Stales, Ill' also
aecrpls till' possihility thaI nt soml'
indeterminate date he may lose his
Ii fe while defending the interests of
the American people. This is aptly ap·
parl'nt in the Oath taken by officers of
the United States Armed Forces, en·
actrd by Congress on 13 May 1884., as
follows in part:
"I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that 1 will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and do·
mestic; that 1 will bear true faith and
allrgiance to the same.... So help me
God".l0
What seems to he forgotten, in some
cases, is that the Oath of Allegiance
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dot's not have any blank spaces for
the individual to fill in stating his
prrferencrs as to when, whNe, how, or
if he prefers to die. It has been said
that the taking of this oath is the
pivotal fact which changes the individual's status from that of civilian to
that of soldier.l1
It is a general rult' of law, long
rl'co:rnizrd, that a soldier takt'n prisonN relllains a 1ll1'1ll1)('r of thl' sl'n·ir('.
('nlitled to all rights and privill'gl's,
and rl'sponsibl(' for all ohligations to
his country except those rendered impossihll' ,or i1I('gal. Tn the first plae-I',
don't i('l ('aptured, or at !t'ast
don't surrl'lHl('r while thl're is any possihle mrans of resistance. However, if
ovt'rcome by superior force, you are
still a soldier. If a soldier is captured
drspitr his efforts to rt'sist, he must give
110 mor(' than his name, rank, serial
numhl'r. and date of birth. To give any
otht'r information than what is authorized might w('ll jeopardize the life
of comradrs. Conceivably this can
mushroom into tht' actual losing of the
war. It ('(In W(·ll h(' thr mod('rn vNsion
of Franklin'~ (HInge: "For want of a
nailthl' ~hol' wa~ 1(l~L. ..."
Tht' prisont'r-of-war sto('kade is only
an I'xt('nsion of the hattlrfirld wJWf('
till' prisoIH'r must he taught to carryon
the struggle with the only weapons
remaining - faith and couragC'. He
has an ohligation to continue to help
his nation in any way possihlC'_ and
that nation has a right to expect a
soldirr to giw his life for his country,
and it mattC'rs not where tht' call comes
to him - on the battlt'field or in a foul
prisoner-of-war compound in some
strangc Jand.
Although a prisoner is temporarily
removed from direct. contact with his
own command during internm('nt, he
is, upon return to his own army, suhjcct to trial hy court-martial "for
offt'nst's as criminal acts or injurious

conduct committC'd during his captivity
agaim:f otht'rs of his comradrs in the
same status."l!! As Abraham Lincoln
counsrled, mC'n should utter or do
nothing for which thry would not willingly hr held responsible through time
and in eternity.
In short, thC' prisoner is always a
soldit'r and tl)(' t'thie-al behavior of
personnC'1 in thC' hands of tIl(' ('nC'lI1)"
is a gra\'c responsihililY whil"h nil
American ('an ignore. Past and fulun'
condurt 'of raptured prrsol1nrl mllst
he analyzed exclusively on the basis
of national interest and srrurit y and
not on l)('rsol1al snrvi\'al considrratiolls.
Human sympathy must 110t be allo\\'(·d
to pervert principle nor excuse weakness or had judgment. But it is. of
courst', to he remembered that thr
survival of prisoners of war is aSsiimed to
be within the realm of national interest
and security. More important is the fact
that the prisoners are still citizens of their
country, and as they are presumably
coming ba<i<, their welI-being and morale
must be of importance. l 3
That a pri~OI/('r-of-war ('amp is a
:<afl' plae(· to n·lax and ":<\\"('at (lilt 1111'
war" is a myth. Thl' majority of Ih(ll'\'
who are fortunatl" C'nough 10 hC' ;lliw
at the conclusion of the war will have
('xternal or internal scars that they
will carry to th(·ir graves. Life in a
prisoner-of-war camp offers many
IlII'ans for continuing tlH' struggle.
Ingenuity_ r1eveflH'SS, rt'sourcefulnl"ss,
patiC'ncl', and courage arc the weapons.
Drf('ats and retrC'ats will occur. but the
important thing is that till! struggle he
continued by whatever means are
feasible at the moment and under the
given conditions. It must he the duty
of those who arc captured to attempt
to escap(' at the first opportunity. Therl"
arc few placl's where even the strongest
ml'n disintegrate physically, mentally,
and morally as 'rapidly as in a
prisonrr-of-war camp.14
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Korea Prompts Code. During
World War II the United States, the
United Kingdom, and China pledged
tlH'ir determination in the Cairo Peclaration of Decemher 19t1·3 that Korea
would. "in due course" hecome free
and incll'pl'nt!('nt. Thi~ pll'dge wa~ sub~('rilll'd to hy the Sovil't {fnion when it
1II'I'lan't! \l'al" a~:tinst Jap:tn 011 B
AllglIst l().\!}.t:;
Following the Japanese SIlI"\'('ll(lel",
11ll' Soviet forces entering Korea on
12 AlIAII~L 19·1·!} acel'pkcl the ~1I1'T(,IHh'r
"f .IaJlalll'~I' fOf('es lIorth of Ihe :lBlh
paralld. American troops landed on 8
Septemher and accepted the surrender
oUh(' Japanese troops in the southern
part of the peninsula on the following
clay. The United States did not con'..
kmplal<' a lastin~ division of Korea
along this linl', whidl was an accidental
line resulting from the exigencies of
the war_ However, this arrangement
quietly hecame a barrier, severing
1,:~OO years of normal interehange bet\\'('('11 all parts of Korl'a, unlil 25 Junl'
10!lO \l'lll'n th!' So\'iet-I'qllippl'l!. tmillel!.
:11111 clin'I'h'1I Nllrth Klln'nn Annic's
:<t I'Ill'k till' Ih'pllhli(' of Klln'a withollt
\\':trnin~. el'Ossing thl' 38th }laralll'l in
filII fOl"e('.
After the United Nations forces had
c1estroYl'd the North Korean Armies
and decimated the Chinese forcl's,
which had entered the war from Red
China, the Soviet Union on 23 June
1951 proposed a truce. IG At 1000 hours,
27 July 1953, after 2 years and 17
days, the Korean Armistice Agreement
was signed at Panmunjom,17 The guns
were silenced and the fighting ceased,
hut a clear-cut victory had not been
won hy either side.
Every war has its disturbing aftermath, and there is always another side
to the coin of victory. If the victory is
not clearly imprinted and the war has
ended in what seems like a stalemate,
the coin becomes suspeet. In any event,

there is usually a postwar inventory.IS
One and a half million Americans
went to Korea to fight and 7,190 were
captured by the enemy. Of this number
6,556 were Army~ 263 were Air Force,
231 were Marine Corps and 40 were
Navy personneJ.19
Following the Korean Armistice
Agreement, the program of repatriation of prisoners of war began with
Opl'ration Little Switch. wherl'in 127
!'oldiers (and 22 other Americans)
were rl'turned to U.S. control durill~
thl' ,i('rio,l 19-25 April ] 953. Til Big
Switch the Commullists returned Lo our
~ide the remaining American surviving
prisoners of war during the period 5
August to 6 September 195;~.2o
During the war, 1}.,tI.28 American
servicemen survived thl' hell of Communist prisoner-of-war compounds. Of
these, 3,973 were members of tlH'
Army. 22-\· of the Air Forel', 200 of thl'
Marine Corps, and 31 of the Navy.!!1 A
total of 2.730 Americans did not return.!!!!
Thl' r('al and lI'rrihl(' storY is tole! ill
the contrast Ill't\l'c'c'n our st;u!!gll' wiih
thl' Gl'rmuns in World War·IT and our
~truggle
with the Communists 111
Korea:
In World War II, of the total reported mi~sinl! in action hy the
American Army, 18 percent ~ot baek
safely to oilr Ii II C'S, 79 percent were
later returned a live as prisoners of
war, and only 3 percent died.
But in Korea, of those reported
missing in action by the American
Army, 12 percent ~ot back to their
units, only 30 perroent lived to he exchanged as prisoners of war; and an
almost unbelievable 38 percent died
behind Communist lines.23

This is a higher prison!'r d('ath rate
than that of any of our preyious wars.
including the Hcvolution, in which
it is estimated that about 33 percent
of the prisoners died. 24
What was even more shocking was
the faet that almost one out of every
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three American prisoners in Korea was
guilty of some sort of collaboration
with the enemy.2:i The degree of collaboration ranged from such serious
offenses as writing anti-American propaganda and informing on comrades to
the relatively innocuous offcnse of
hroadcasting Christmas greetings home
and thereby putting the Communists
in a favorable light. Futhermore, during
Ill(' ('ntire KOrt'an eonnict, not one U.S.
scn'iceman cscaped from a permancnt
('llI'IllY prison camp and 5nccC'ssfnlly
madl' his way /Jilek 10 fril'lully Jjll('s.211
Troubled hy the problem of collaboration, the Defense Dcpartment
IH'gan studies Oil 3,300 returnl~d American prisonC'rs to find out who had
done what and why. By joint action
of the services, all of the prisoners recovC'red were scrrenrd by military intelligence agencies. Of the 565 whosr
conduct was questioned, 373 were
cleared or the charges dropped after
investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, 68 were separated from the services, 3 resigned, one received reprimand, 2 were given restricted assignments, and 11 were convicted by courtmartial. 27 No case was brought for
court-martial action in which there was
evidence of duress, brainwashing, or any
other type of coercion. There were also
21 men who chose to stay with the
Communists. Adding these to the 11
convicted men makes a total of at least
32 Americans who did not measure up.
Army figures indicated that 15 percent
of the Americans had actively collaborated with the Communists, and only 5
percent had vigorously resisted. 2 8
All in all, sinister and regrettable
things happened in the prison camps of
Korea. Evidence indicated that the high
death rate was not due primarily to
Communist maltreatm('nt, that it could
be accounted for largely by the ignorance or the callousness of the prisoners
themselves. 29
In every war but one in which the

United States has participated, the conduct and personal behavior of its servicemen who became prisoners of war
presented no unforeseen problcms and
gave rise to no particular concern in
the country as a whole. In none of
them was there such a large breakdown
of morale or widespread collaboration
with the captors. Moreover, regardless
of the rigors of the camps, in ewry war
but one, some of the prisoners managed
through ingennity, daring. and plain
good Inck to escape. That one war was
the Korean war. 30
Accordingly, the Army soon began
collecting data for a formal stndy of
the behavior of its personnel taken as
prisoners of war in Korea. A major
result of this study was the promulgation on 17 Augnst 1955, by President
Eisenhower, of the new Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces
of the United States.
The Code of Conduct was - like the
('v('nls in Kor.('a· that inspir('d it rOlllpl('trly linpr('('('(knll'cl. N('\·pr h('fofl'
had n Prl'l'idl'III fOllnd il 11I'('I'S5ary In
clarify or r('slatl' thl' principles of ronduct for military personnel. The fact
that it was necessary to spell out what
had always been tuk!'n for granted by
Americans as constituting the unquestioned duties and obligations of the
fighting man indicated how greatly
the Korean war differed from the seven
major wars that this nation had previously fought.

II -

THE CODE OF
CONDUCT

Purpose. The majority of honorahle professions have some form of
('re('d or cod(' of conduct. l\Iore timrs
than not it is an unwritten creed, being
based primarily on mutual understanding and professional pride. Some professions, however, have formal creeds
or oaths of long standing such as the
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Hippocratic oath of the medical profession which dates from about 400

B.C.l
On 7 August 1954 Secretary of Defrnse Charles E. Wilson created an ad
hoc committee under the chairmanship
of Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, to study the conduct of military prrsonnel during comhat - particularly whilc in a prisonerof-war status. 2 After intensive study
and consultation with some 68 civic
h'aders, formrr prisoners of war, and
Government representatives, the committee issued its 82-page report. 3
On thc basis of this rcport Sccrctary
Wilson, on 17 May 1955, appointed the
Defcnse Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. The main purpose of this
group, which was composed of ten
membrrs - five civilians and five military, from all services, with Secretary
Burgess as Chairman - was to provide
memhers of thc Armed Forces with a
simplr, ('asily undrrstood rodr to gov1'1"11 thrir ('omluet n:; Amrricmdighting
1111'11:1

The ('ollllnittee mpt f n·qlll·ntly for
over 2 months, and on 29 July 1955 it
presentrd to the Secretary a proposed
codc of conduct.:; Nineteen days later,
on 17 August 1955, President Eisenhower promulgated Executive Order
Number 10631 whcrein he described
for the Armed Forces of the United
States a six-point Code of Conduct.
This Code of Conduct was the first
clearly defined standard of action applicahle to American prisoners after
capture'. This set of principles was designed to mold a new set of fundamental attitudes for U.S. service personnl'l
with a view to helping them and their
coulltry, as wrll. survive any future
conflict. The Advisory Committec
whieh drcw up the Code offered the
following in support of their proposition when it was forwarded for the
Prrsident's signature: ".We can find

no basis for making recommendations
other than on the principles and foundations which have made America
free and strong, and on thc qualities
which wc associate with men of charactrr and integrity."o
The Unitrd States had finished a
war' with an enemy who had fought
not only on the hattlefidd, but in thc
prison camps as weIl, by manipulating
the minds of its captives. The Communists had looked upon a prisoncr of war
as an asset of the military machine
without respect or regard for his rights
as a human heing. 7 The whole prisonerof-war question was changrd completely hy their insidious and inhumane
methods. Our Goyernment and the military services rralized that our fighting
man not only had to he taught how to
fight physically, hut hc must know how
to fight back mrntally and morally as
weIl.
While strrtl, thr Code of Conduct is
tempprrcl hy a rrcop:llitiOlf of thl' passihility of 1'lWIIlY dl'pnn'ity ;tnll hy
a!'i'Urm1l'I'S of ju!'ticl' for thOi'l' pri>,olll'r>'
who hrrak undl'r torturr. It consists of
six articles in simple languagl' that any
American can understand. It starts with
the sentence, "I am an American fighting man"; arid concludes with the sentcnce, "I wiII trust in my God and in
the United States of America." In betwet'n these two doctrines the serviceman wiII plcdge that he will never surrt'nder of his own free wiIl, that he wiII
endeavor to escape if caught, that as a
prisoner he wiII not betray his feUow
prisont'rs, and that he wiII refuse to
give any information beyond his name,
rank, service number, and date of
hirth.
By the adoption of the Code, unified
guidance and a basic philosophy were
provided for all the services - guidance to be utilized as an instructional
\"(·hirle to aid future prisoners of war
in their fight against an enemy who
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may not only seek their land but their
lives, minds, loyalty, and allegiance.
The acquired mutual respect can develop the interreliance and unity of
purpose which is essential to victory in
battle and to resistance and survival in
a POW camp: In essencl', the Code
dol'S more than epitomize the moral
guidelines tbat can sustain a soldier
through many trials and tribulations;
it also sets forth the basic rules that
hopefully will enahle him to ~urvive
until the day when adversity gives way
to vindication and final victory.s
The purpose of the Armed Forces
Code of Conduct can be summed up as
twofold: To protect, at whatever cost,
the cause for which this country stands,
and at the same tfme ensure the great('st hope and survival for the men who
Sl'rve that cause.o
The Articles.
AI'li('lt' I - "I am :111 :\lIl1'ricall
Fi)!hlill)! l\lan. I !'l'rn' ill Ihe Forcl'!'
whie-II ~uard my country and our way
or Ii re. I am prepared to give my Iifl'
in thpir defense."
Intent. A member of the
Armed Forces is always a fighting
man. As such, it is his sworn duty to
oppose the enemies of the United
States, regardless of the circumstances
or hardships encountered, whether on
the battlefield or in a prisoner-of-war
camp. This article could be said to express the true feelings of each American sl'rviceman who has fought, suffered, or died in battle. The words themselves not only descrihe the spirit of
the past, but of the future as well. Each,
from the most s('nior to the most junior,
must have sincere pride in his country
and in the uniform he wears. He must
fulfill his pledged and moral military
obligations with conscientiousness and
with honor.

A point in article I which deserves
special attention is the phrase, "/ am
prepared to give my life . ..." The true
and final test of an individual's "preparedness" is that he is willing to risk
death in carrying out his duties. When
an American says he is prepared 10
give his life iIi defense of his country,
it should not only encompass d('ath in
battle, but death at whatever place the
situation dictates whether in or out of
service. 10
Basic attitudes and everyday rOIltines go a long way toward this end.
The men who do their best with every
assignment; who look for what needs
to be done, and do it; who find ways
to improve themselves and their work;
who do all that is required and then
some - these are the men who are
prepared to give their lives. They are
already doing so!
Article I offers no difficulty in its
interpretation of what is implied and
what is expected of the military man
or woman. TIl!' OfficI'r and Enlislmrnt
Oath. thl' Constitution. and thl' hashprinciples upon which our country was
founded offer adequate understanding.
The President made it clear in his
Executive Order that the words, "I am
an American fighting man," apply to
every member of the Armed Forces.
Drpartment of Defense Directive
1300.7, par. II, declares that the Code
is applicable to all members of the
Armed Forces at all times. The use of
the phrase is' clearly a dramatic device
uSl'd to emphasize that the reason for
the existence of soldiers is to fight the
country's enemies rather than limit the
application of the Code to combat men
only.
Article II - "I will never surrender of my own free wiIl. If in command I will never surrender my men
while thl'Y still have the means to resist."
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Intent. As an individual, a
member of the Armed Forces may
never voluntarily surrender himself.
When he is isolated and can no longer
inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his
duty to evade capttire and rejoin the
nearest friendly forces.
The rI'!;pom:ibility and authority of a
commandl'r neVl'r extcnds to the sur·
render of his command to the enemy
while it has the power to resist or
l'vade. Whell isolah,d, cut olI, or sur·
rounded, a unit must continue to fight
until Tl'liev('d or able to rejoin friendly
forces hy breaking out, or by evading
the enemy.ll
This is one of the most controversial
articles in that it implies "a lost, last
stand," "fight to the last man," etc.
Most military men will argue that if
the situation so dictates and the odds
are stacked so overwhelmingly against
you, then it is better to live to fight
:tnoth('r day than to commit obvious
suit'idt'.
AIlIOII/! tIl(' IllUIIY hazards of the mili·
tary profession, the risk of capture
by the enemy is just as much a possi·
bility as death or injury. The fighting
man accepts -these risks each and every
time he enters combat in order to carry
out his assigned mission. He should
never sell himself short, however, by
meekly surrendering just because the
situation looks hopeless.
There is a great difference between
surrender and -being captured. To be
captured is to be taken prisoner; sur·
render means to give up. Under certain
circumstances, an initial impression
might indicate that surrender would
appear to be thc proper course of ac·
tion. However, from the standpoint of
pure self.interest, the man who will·
fully surrenders to the enemy is not
only selling himself short, but his coun·
try as well. It was pointed out hy the
Advisory Committee which drafted the
Code of Cond.uct that, "If individuals

and commanders were permitted to sur·
render whenever a situation seems to be
desperate it would become an open in·
vitation to all weak of will or depressed
of spirit." We cannot deny that some
men - the "weak of will" - must be
frequently reminded of their obliga.
tions and compelled to do what is
right and proper, ev('n though to do so
is in their be.st interests. Just as train·
ing drills are repeated until men re·
spond to eml'r/!l'nci('s almost instinc·
tively and do the right things despite
confusion, the guidelines in article II
can remind a fighting man not to give
up when for the moment his situation
seems hopeless.
Article III - "If I am captured
I will continue to resist by all means
available. I will make every effort to
escape and aid others to escape. I will
accept n('ither parole nor special fa·
vors from the enemy."
lul('ul. TIl(' dUly or a 1111'111LeI' or thl' Armed Forces to ('ontillul'
resistance 11)' all means at his disposal
is not lessened by the misfortune or
capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Con.
v('ntion pertains and must be ex·
plained. Article 82 provides as follows:

A prisoner of war s~all be subject
to the laws, regulations and orders in
force in the armed forces of the De·
taining Power; the Detaining Power
shall be justified in taking judicial
or disciplinary measures in respect of
any offense committed by a prisoner
of war against such laws, regulations
or orders. However, no proceedings
or punishments contrary to the pro·
visions of this Charter shall be al·
lowed.
If any law, regulation or order of
thc Detaining Power shall declare
acts committed by a prisoner to be
punishable, wherl!as the same acts
would not be punishable if com·
mitted by a member of the forces of
the Dctaining Power, such acts shall
entail disciplinary punishments only.12

He will escape if able to do so and will
assist others to escape. Parole agree'
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ments are promises given the captor by
a prisoner of war upon his faith and
honor to fulfill stated conditions, such
as not to bear arms or not to escape, in
consideration of special privileges, usually releases from captivity or lessened restraint. He will never sign or
('nkr into a paroI!' agrcement_I!!
No matter how hard he may have
fought to prevent it, there is always
IIIP chance Ihnt a fighling man IlIl1y I)(~
captuf('d by the enemy_ This in itself is
no disgrace, so long as he extends the
fight from the battlefield into the
prisoner-of-war compound_ Using the
only weapons still available to him his wits and his will - he can continue
to fight. Courage, determination, patience, and faith - especially faith in
one's self, one's country, and one's God
- are the primary means to resist
when other weapons are gone.
Today and in the foreseeable future
our enC'mies ar(', and most HkC'ly will
r('main. r.ommuni~I~. c.nlllnl\lni~l~ attl'llIpt all sorts of trich'ry, force, or
other unorthodox methods to induce a
prisoncr to obligate himself. One of
their more subtle methods is thc offer
of parole.
The primary reason that the United
States prohibits agreements is hecause
the enemy never offers parole unless it
is to his advantage. Secondly, the POW
who enters into a parole agrC'ement
with the enemy cannot be trusted hy
his fellow prisoners, and mutual trust
is most important in the battle to survive.

Article IV - "If J bC'come a
prisoner of war, I will k('('p faith with
my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action
which might he harmful to my comradC's. If I am s('nior, I will take command. T£ not, I will ohey the lawful
ordC'rs of those appointed over me and
will back them up in every way."

-Intent. Informing. or any
othC'r action to the detriment of a
fellow prisoner, is despicable and is exprC'ssly forbidden. Prisoners of war
must ayoid helping thC' C'nemy and mar
tlwrdorC' h(' madC' to suffC'r ('oC'rriyC'
int"rro~ation.

Strong ll'adership is essential to dis·
ciplinC'. Without disriplin('. camp organization, rC'sistanc(', a 1111 (,\'(,11 survival may he impossihle. Personal hygien(', camp sanitation, and ('are of
sick and wounded arc impC'rativC'. Officers and noncommissioned officers of
the United States will continuc to carry
out their responsibilities and exercise
their authority suhsC'quent to captun·.
The senior line officer or noncommissioned officer within the prisoner-ofwar camp or group of prisonrrs will
assume command according to rank
(a precC'dence) without regard to
sC'n"irl'. This rC'sponsihility and acrountahility may not hl' (·\";lIl"d. If tIl!' !'('nior offic('r or noncolllmi~siolH'd Om('('r
is incapacitated or unahle to act for
any r('ason. command will Ill' assumed
hy the next senior. If the foregoing
organization cannot he effected, an organization of elected representatives,
as provided for in articles 79-81, Gen('va Convention Relative to Treatment
of Prisoners of War, or a covert organization, or hoth, will be formecl. 14
Thc ronditions of life as a POW
undC'r thr Communists emphasize the
ne('d for leadership development predicated upon the ahility to acquire and
hold the support of subordinates on tlw
hasis of an individual leader's rharnrt('r. (,Illotional pel"1'onality, j uclgmrnt.
and powers of persuasion.
There are three general types of offC'n1'(,5 which are of hasic intC'rest to the
~('I"\'ir(,1'"l!i OnC' type arisC's whC'n a
prisoner sreks to take advantage of his
fellow prisoners' misery. In the service
vi!'w, a prisoner who informs to the
enemy on other POW's, who steals
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from his sick huddies, who robs the
drad. who obtains extra benefits from'
the captors in exchange for monitoring
or collaborating for his captors merits
p\llli~llJnrnt.

Tlll'n Ihrrr i~ till' tyP(' of crinw com·
millt'd hy a fl'W ()fli('er~ UlIII nOllcommh:~ionrd officers abuse of thcir
pOl'ition hy mi~guiding or failing to
It'ad \\'h(,11 il was ill Ilwir POWl'I' 10 do
1'0. This. too, merits punishment.
TIl(' third type of crime is the trea!ion type, which is committed when a
military man voluntarily furnishes intrlligrnce or propaganda materials to
the rnemy.

Article V - "When questioned,
should I become a prisoner of war, I
am hound to give only namr, rank,
~l'l'vice numher, and date of hirth. I
will ('\'1\(11' anl'\\,l'l'in~ fmlhl'r qUI'~tion~
III III(' ulmosl of m)' ahililY. I \\'iIImakl'
110 oral or wrillrll ~Ialrllll'nl!i disloyal
10 my ('Olllllry and it!i a1lirs or harmful
In tlH'ir musl'."
Intent. When qurstioned, a
prisonel' of war is required hy the
Grnr\'a Convention and permitted hy
thi!i Code to disclose his namr, rank,
sl'rvirr number, and date of birth. A
)lri~OJwr of war may also communicatr
with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of
war and, whrn appropriate, on routine
matters of camp administration. Oral
or writtrn confessions, whether true or
falsI.', questionnaires, personal history
statrmrnls. propaganda rrcordings and
hroadcasl~_ appeals to olhrr prisonrrs
of war, sif!nahlrps to peace or surrpnder appeals, self-criticisms, or any
othpr oral or writtl'n communication on
hehaIf of the rnrmy or critiral or harmful 10 the United States, its AlIirs, the
Armrd Forces, or other prisoncrs are
forhiddrn.
It is a violation of the Geneva Convcntion to place a prisoner of war

undpr physical or mental torture or any
other form of coercion to secure from
him information of any kind. If, howe\'er_ a prisoner is suhjl'ctrd to such
treatment, he will endrayor to avoid hy
('\'rry means the discIo~ure of any information or the making of any statement or thr prrformance of any action
harmful to II\(' inll'resls of Ihe Unilr(l
Statl's or its Allil's or \\'hieh will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.
Tn view of a U.S.S.H. re~;prvation to
article 85 of the Geneva Convention,
the signing of a confession or the making of a statempnt by a prisoner is
likely to he uspd to convict him as a
war criminal under the laws of his
captors, This cOl1\'iction has the e[ect
of removing him from the prisoner-ufwar status and, according to Ill(' reservation, denies him any protection undrr trrm~ of the Genpya Com'Plltion
alld rl'patrialion ulltil a )lri~oll Sl'ntrllCl'
is SPITed, The rl'srr\'alioll is as follows:
The Union of So\'i('1 Socialist Rrpuhlics does not ('onsider itself hound
hy the ohligation which follows
Article 85, to extend the application
of the Convention to the prisoners of
war who have hcrn convicted under
thc law of the Dctaining Power, in
accordance with the principles of the
Nuremhurg trial, for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, it heing
understood that persons convicted of
such crimes must he suhjected to the
conditions ohtaining in the country in
question for those who undergo their
punishment. 1G

The American serviceman is instructed to give to the enemy upon caplurr. only his nmm~, rank, srrvice nU111her. and date of hirth, Anything that
he thereafter gives the enemy, he gives
upon his own responsibility, But it is
ridiculous to suppose that a prisoncr is
not pl~rmitted to !Ouy anything morc to
his captors, and this is well understood
hy each of the services. A man held
in the helpless situation in which a
POW finds himself must cooperate with
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his captors by getting in line when
required, by faIling out of formations,
and by obeying the other routine POW
camp order~.
Thc framers of the Code agreed that
a line of resistance must he drawn
somewhere and accepted the name,
rank, and 'service number provision of
the Geneva Conv('ntions as the lim' of
rl'~istal\(:(~. In the face of experieJl(:I"
however, the Committee recognized
that a POW may be suhjected to an
extreme of cOl'rcion beyond his ability
to resist. In this battle with the interrogator the prisoner is driven from
his first line of resistance and must be
trained for resistance in successive positions. It was the Committee's conclusion
that the inoh'ioual must make a final
stano. HI' must not disclose vital military information and above all may
not oisplay, in woro or oped. oisloyalty
to his country. his sen·ice. or his commOI's.li

Article VI - "I will never forget that I am an American ~ighting
Man, responsible for my actions and
dedicated to the principles which made
my country free. I will trust in my
God and the United States of America."
Intent. The provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
whenever appropriate, continue to apply to members of the Armed Forces
while prisoners of war. Upon repatriation the conduct of prisoners wiII be
I'xamim'o as to the circumstances of
capture and through the period of detention with oue regaro for the rights
of the inoividual and consideration for
the conditions of captivity.
A member of the Armed Forces who
becomes a prisoner of war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to
his country, his service, and his unit.
The life of a prisoner of war is hard.
He must never give up hope; he must
resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners

of war who stand firm and united
against the enemy wiII aid one another
in surviving this ordea1. 18
The en.emy will respect an indivioual
only as far as he respects himself. Pea!'c
of mind and degrce of success wiII he
directly proportional to the strength of
moral principles. The POW must establish the level of his moral intcgrity
in the eyes of his captors. In doing so
it may be of a small consequence, but
he will have won respect for himself,
his service, and his country. A fundamental requirement of simple virtue
which provides a firm foundation for
patriotism and may become the fount
of courage is: "A man has honor if he
holds himself to a course of conduct,
because of a conviction that it is in the
general interest, even though he is well
aware that it may lead to inconveni.ence, personal" loss, humiliation or
grave physical risk."19
Thc Korean conflict cIcarly rewall'd
that captured troops serve the Communists as a powerf!ll instrument for
furthering psychological warfare goals.
The enemy attempted, with some success, to use prisoners of war in Korea
in an organizeo propaganda campaign
to discrcdit the United Statcs and
United Nations in the Far East. The
seriousness of' this threat cannot be
measured merely in terms of the number of troops likely to be takcn prisoner, or even of the smaller number who
would actually contribute significantly
to enemy psychological warfare activities. In Communist hands all POW's
are potential ioea-wcapons, ano the SIlCcessful exploitation of anyone man
may damage a nation's cause. 20
The Committee. in drafting the Code,
was working on 1111.' premise that in tIl!'
future U.S. military personnel who fall
into Communist control wiII be subjected to similar intensive indoctrination of the so-called brainwashing category and that more nceds to he done to
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pr<'pare soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines for such treatment. 21

III-THE CODE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law has been defined as
thos!' rul<'s for int<'rnational conduct
whi('h haV<' mcl gen(~ral ae("!'pl:UH:I~
among the community or nations. 1 It
r<,fleets and records those accommoda·
tions which, over centurit's, states have
found it in their interest to make. It
rests upon the common consent of
civilized communities. It is made up of
precedents, judicial decisions, treaties,
arbitrations, international conventions,
the opinions of learned writers in the
firld. and a host of other acts which
reprrsrnt in the aggrrgate those rules
whieh enlightened nations and their
propl!' arcrpt as hring llppropriatr to
gO\"l'rn inll'rnalional conduct.
That IlwTl' is sueh a law or war as
part of the law of the community of
nations is rxpressly statcd by the Nuremberg Tribunal in its judgment in the
rollowing passage:
The very essence of the London
Ar;reement of Aur;ust 1945 is that
im.li\'iduals ha\'!! international duties
whir-h transcend the national ohligations of ohedience imposed by the
individual state. He who violates the
laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law. 2

We, as citizens of a democracy, do
not need to be reminded that no law
is better than the people who make it.
Our own legal code is the expression of
our social consciousness and the outgrowth of an enlightened and aroused
public opinion. The body of intrrnational law relating to the victims of
war is the expression of a code of social
justice on which people of many different races, tongues, and political beliefs
have agreed in the name of their common humanity.

During the ancient period of history,
prisoners of war could be killed. and
they were yer.y often at once actually
butchered or offered as sacrificrs 10 the
gods. 3 If they were spared they were,
as a rule, made slaves, but belligerents
also on occasion exchanged their prisonrrs or lihrratcd tlwlll for ransom.
This procedure continued through the
Middle Ages, but under the influence
of Christianity a prisoner's fate was
mitigated, and by the time modern international law gradually came into existence killing and enslaving prisoners
of war had all but disappeared.
The rules of international law have
undrrgone a considerahle developllleilt
silll'l' thr middle of th!' 17th crntury.
AI Ihat time the law. as mentionl'd
ahove. did little more than forbid thl'
!'nsllln'mt'ni llnd indisrriminate killing
of eaptiws. In l'omparison wilh tIll'
slall' of 11\(':;:(' rull's. IIH' l'uslomary law
of Ihl' 20th el'ntury Sl'l'mS to involve II
cOn1pl!'x llnd compn'h!'nsiv!' body of
rights and duties for any state which
engages in war.
Today, as we speak of international
law, those of us in the military tend
to Ihink principally of the Hague and
G('neva Conventions. It should be noted
and understood, however, that a distinction is made between Geneva Law
and the Hague Law, resulting from the
two Peace Conferences held in that city
in 1899 and 1907, which codifies the
rules of war in all matters outside the
scope of the Geneva Conventions. The
Hague Law relates in particular to
the choice of weapons and of warfare. 4
Though both the Geneva and Hague
Laws are based on humanitarian principll's and aim llL Tl'straining viol!'ncl\
the Geneva Conventions more especially concern the protection of the individual against the abuse of force, while
the Hague Conventions enforce interstate rules on its actual employment.
Further improvement of humanitar-
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ian treatmt'nt of prisoners of war ocr.urred during the War of Secession
when the American Government promulgated in 186 /1, Gertain humane regulations drawn up hy the legal expert
Lieber. The "Lieber Laws," as they
were called, laid down that prisoners
of war, as hdliger('l\ts, arc prisoners of
the Government and not of the captor.
They moreover stipulated that prisoners of war shall be given good food in
abundance, as far as possible, and shall
be treated humanely.5 It was logical
then that the protection which the Geneva Conventions of 22 August IBM
had just conft'rred on the wounded and
sick of tht' Armed Forct's in the fierd
was also made applicable to prisoners
of war.
It was in keeping with these idt'as
that the prisoner-oF-war qm'stion was
rai~l'd at The IIagm' in 1899 at the
Fir~1 Peace COllfl'n'llcl'. allll all inll'rnational convention of this subject was
I'stahlisheq for the first time. This convention was then amended following
World War I to hecome the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929 establishing the status of prisoners of war.1l
As a f('sult of the experit'nce of the
Second World War, this convention
was revised to ht'come the Third Gen·
eva Convention of 12 August 1949.
This Conycntion contains 14R articles,
hesidt's the annt'xes, as compared to
97 arlicles in the corresponding 1929
Convention and only 17 in the ('hapter
on prisoners of war in tht' Hague Convention. 7 This incf('asl' is no doubt due
to the fact that in modern warfare prisoners are ht'ld in larger numhers, hut it
also characterizes the desire of the 1949
Convention, represrnting all nations, to
suhmit all a~prcts of captivity to humane rf'gulations of international law.
One of the rssential difficulties in any
drort to ameliorate thl~ conditions o[
prisoners of war is the nec('ssity of
reconciling military and political inter-

ests with purely humanitarian ideas.!;
It appears, however, that some progress
was made toward this t'nd as the 19th
century saw new concepts of natural
law and a ncw humanitarian movement. The civilizrd world finally accepted the fact that the prisoner of war
was not a criminal hut merely an rnrmy no longl'r ahle to hrar arms who
should hr liberated at the dose of the
hostilities and he respected and humanely treated while in captivity. Farseeing and broadmindrd legal and diplomatic action has since translated concrpt into practice through a series of
codi fications a('crptrc\ as binding by
statrs and successively extended or
amplifird when experirnce showed
tlll'm to he inadrquate. Thf' Brussrls
Draft of 18(.1., the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and ]1)07. 1111' spr('ial agrrl'n1l'lIts mac\1' IlI'lwf'1'1I 1l('lIil!l'renls ill
HI'rIlI' in 1917 alld 11)1 It allli Ihl' (;1'11I'ya COllycntions of 1929. whieh dryollall or par! of their dallsl's to prisoners
or war, reprl'sent the principal stages of
eyolution.
The third Geneva Conference was
('onv('ned by the Swiss Federal Council
at Geneva and deliberated from 21
April to 12 August 1949 for the purpOSI' of revisin/!, amon:r others, the
Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929
rriative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War. Thl' Conrerence established the
tl'xts of four Conventions of which the
thircl ConYl'nlion. "Grneva Convrntion
HclaLiw To The Trl'atmrnt of PrisonI'rS or \Var," is applicahle to this paprr.
These Com'l'ntions, the text of which
has heen established in the English and
French languages, arc attached to the
prt'sl'nt act. The original and the docunll'nls accompanying it were deposited
in Ihr archives of the Swiss Confederation.!)
Thr Geneva Conventions of 1949
apply to all casrs of declared war or
any other armed conflict which may
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arise hetween two or more of the parties to the Convention, evrn if the state
of war is not recognized hy thrm.l0
Mt'mhers of Ihe U.S. Armed Forces
who fall into the power of the enemy
in the' course of a war are declared
prisoners of war and arc entitled to the
prot<·(·tion accordt'd hy thl' Convention.
It !'hould hr noted at this timc that
none of thr major parties of the Korean
war (United States, Communist China,
Norlh. and South Korea) had ratified
the Convention at the outbreak of the
war. All announced an intention to adhrr(' to it, however, and the North
Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Pak Hun Yong, sent a message to the'
S('crrtary General of the United Nation!' on 13 July 1950 in which he
statl'd that his country agreed' to ahide
hy Ihe 1929 and 1949 Gl'JWVa ConvrnI i()n~.ll

TIll' ilia jo\" pa rl h·i pa 1\ I~ ha \"l' rn Ii fil'd
Iht' Con\"('nlion of 1919 and thus arc
parlies 10 it as arc Norlh and South
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos,
and Sovirt Russia.12
Thr remaining portion of this chapter wiII consider the Code of Conduct '
for the Armed Forces in view of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and attempt to determine their compatibility
and to note any areas of conflict which
might prove harmful to a, prisoner of
war, both from the standpoint of survival and from a legal point of view.
Article I and VI of the Code of
Conduct are important in that they
emphasize that the American soldier is
a fighting man responsible for his actions and dedicated to guarding his
country a~d to the principl('s and way
of life for which his country stands.
This indicates, first, the military personnel to whom the Code appli('s and,
secondly, that they are accountable for
failure to adhere to the Code.
The Code's charge to members of the
Armed Forces of the United States that

they arc responsible for their actions
and the clear warning contained in
D~partment
of Defense Directive
1300.7 of 8 July 1964 (that the provisions of the Uniform Code of Mililary
Justice apply at all times) arc not
compatible with the declaration of the
Grn('va COllvl'nl ion Ihat prisoJll!rs of
war arc subject to the laws, regulations, and orders of the detaining powI'r while in captivity.
Although the legislation of the Dctaining Power is applicable to him
durinp: his captivity, he remains suh·
jel·t to the military laws of his State
of orip:ill. a~ a IIll'lIlbl'r of its armed
.fon'e". He may thC'f(,fore he made
an~wl'rahle bl"fore the courts of his
country for his acts, and cannot plead
in defense that national lep:islation is
inapplicahle hecause it is suspended
hy Article 82.13

Thi" wa" hortH' oul whrn thl' Army
Board of Ht'vit'w in Ihl' Batdwln\" I'a"t'
(19 C.i\I.H. ,152 of 1%5) n'jl'Cll't! 11ll'
at'cuspd's aq.HlIlH'nt Ihat till' GpJl(',-a
Convention Relativ(' 10 the Trralml'nl
of Prisoners of War (1929) placed all
authority over POW's in the captor
power and withdrew such power from
the United States so that a general
court-martial is without jurisdiction to
try a repatriated POW for POW camp
misconduct. The Board 'noted that the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 were also
adopted for application by the opposing forces in the Korean war, but this
did not alter its rejection of the asserted
defense.14
The Geneva Convention does not
contain any provision attempting to
prohibit a party to the conflict from
applying its domestic law to a repatriatrd prisoner of war for misconduct
during captivity. It is simply that in
the prison camp only the discipline of
the detaining power may be enforced,
while domestic law enforcement of the
prisoner's country must await his return to its control. It is not the duty
of the detaining power to enforce the
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laws of the nation of its prisoners. They
must he self-enforced.
Article II of the Code of Conduct
will not be considered in the light of
Convcntion compatihility in that it docs
not concern prisoners of war but reJat!'!' to !'Ilrrcnder.
Arlidl' ITI of Ilw Co(Je (]('al:; wilh
Ihn'(' important aspects of a prisoner's
detainment - resistance, escape, and
parolc - and cach will be discussed
separately.
Resistance. Mental and moral re:::istancl' to thl' dctaininl! powcr's I'/Torts
to "brainwash," indoctrinate_ and dl'moralize in order to win converts, obtain intelligence, or exploit the prisoners of war for propaganda purposes is
n('Cl'ssary and cNtainly dol'S not coniiiI'! wilh Ih,' purpo:,,' or inll'nt of till'
C,·n,'\·:\ Con\'l'ntillll. 110wl'\',·I". Ihl' pro·
\'isioll of the Cod,' to "ri.'sist by all
1II1'1\IIS availablp" rl'quircs Amcrican
pri:'olll'rs of war to extend the battleficld into thc prison camp and ddeat
the captors, not only mentally but physically, e\'en in captivity. This requirement spems to connict with the spirit
and purpose of the Convention.
Article 13 of the Geneva Convention
of 1919 states in part "that prisoners
of war must at all times be humanely
treated."!:; With regard to the concept
of humanity, the purpose of the Convention is none other than to define
thl' correct way to behave toward a Imman being; each individual is desirous
of the treatment corresponding to his
status and can therefore judge how he
should, in turn, treat his fellow human
beings. It does not sel'm consistent for
a country which has signed and ratified
a treaty providing for the humane
treatment of its military personnel who
may hecome prisoners of war to promulgate subsequent instructions to its
military personnel that. while expecting humane trl'atment from their cap-

tors, they must convNt the prisoncr-ofwar camp into a battlefield. This action
could, if carried to extremes. diminish
or eliminate completely the prospects of
humane treatment contemplated hy the
Convention. As quoted in part from the
U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, 2 International
Law 93-95 (1962), p. 95, par. E.:
A new and disturbing aspect of the
handling of prisoners of war was encountered in that the Communist
soldiers, even after capturt', continued
by intrigue and open violence to light
against their captors. International
law, as represented hy the 1949
Geneva Convention, did not contemplate an openly ho~tilc contt'~t between the captor and the raptive. If
such practice should continue in
future wars. many of the humanitarian
provisions of the 1949 Conn'ntion
would hl'l"OIlH' diffil'ult to implcml'nt.

Escape. Escape, in international law,
is the state of a prisoner's havjng
placed himself beyond the- immediate
control of the public authorities of the
previously detaining state without their
consent. This status is terminated by
recapture or death or by leaving the
territory occupied by the enemy, at
which time the escape becomes successful.! 6
The requirement that an American
serviceman make cvery effort to I'scape
if captured is an accepted military tradition, neithcr contrary to military
honor nor to moral law and is even
regarded ag the accomplishment of a
patriotic duty. Therefore, its inclusion
in the Code of Conduct is highly appropriate. The game application to
medical personnel and chaplains, how('ver, conflicts with the gpecia\ status
accorded them under Article 33 of thc
1949 Geneva Convention, which in part
says:
Members of the medical personnel
and chaplains while retained by the
detaining power with a view to as·
sisting prisoners of war, shall not he
considered as prisoners of war. They
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5hall, howcver, rcreive as a minimum,
the henefits and protection of the
present Comention, and shall also be
granted all facilities necessary to pro·
vide for the medical care of, and reo
lil!iou5 ministration to prisoncr!'> of
war.

The only reason for retention of
suC'h prrsolllH'1 is to utilizr'thrir medi·
cal and religious services in the care of
the physical and religious needs of the
priSOIH'rS of war. It is inconsistent and
improper for this country to agree that
such personnel may be retained in
order that their professional services
may hr utilized for the benefit of the
prisoners of war and then require them
10 makr e\'ery efIort to rscapr and thus
"drsert" Ihose who need them.
With the exception of the application
of Ihe rscape rf'quirement to medical
11I'r:;01llH'1 and chaplains as nolf'd ahoV(',
IIH' n·(Jltin·nwnl Ihal Anwril'nn :;pl"\'il'l'
1II' r:;o 1II 11'1 lIIak(, (,\'l'ry l'lTort III ('~('apl'
anel aiel olhers 10 ('scapf' is compatihle
with Ihe Geneva Convention.'

Parole. Article 21 (2) of the Con·
wntion provides: "Prisoners of war
may Iw partiaH)' or whoHy rcleasf'C1 on
parole or promise, insofar as is aHoweo
hy the laws of the Powcr on which they
depend. Such measure shaH be taken
particularly in cases where this may
contrihute to the improvement of their
state of health. No prisoner of war shaH
he compl'Hed to accept liberty on parole
or promise." Articlt' 21 (3) provides:
"Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each
Party to the connict shaH notify the
ad\'l'TSl' Parly of the laws and regula.
tions aHowing or forbidding its own
national to accept liberty on parole or
promise."17
Jn essence, the prisoner himself
should know and understand whether
or not his own cOllntry approves or dis·
approves of his accepting parole. If he
docs not, then the detaining power may
not offer release on parole to a prisoner

if the laws and regulations of the power
on which he depends forhid him to ac·
cept. Such is the case of the American
s('n'ic~man, as stated in the Code of
Conduct.
There is no direct conllict between
the Code's prohibition of acceptance of
parole and spccial favors ano thc ] 91.9
Gt'IIl'va Convention. As previou:;ly
noted, the parolt' laws of the power in
whosc service the prisoner of war was
at the time of capture must be oh·
served by the detaining power.
Hence, while no direct conflict exists
bt'twecn the Code and the provisions of
the Convenlion on the point of no
parole, it 001'5 s('t'm to connict with the
spirit allo purpose of the provisions for
retaining medical personnel and chap.
lains in that they may he IHl'vt'nted
from fuH}' performing in some situa·
lions whf'f('. wilhoul parolf', tIl!' ('amp
('ommander would not Iwrmit Ilwm 10
lean' Iht' ('amp to minister to pri!'olll'r:;
of war in olhf'r hospitals. camp~. and
labor detachments and in the CUSf' of
sick or woundf'd prisoners when, as the
Convention stipulatf's, "it may contribute to the imp~ovement of tllf'ir state
of health."
Article IV of the Code of Conduct
of'als with the areas - keep faith, take
command and obey lawful orders.

Keep Faith. There does not seem
to he any conflict hetween the Code's
rt'quirement that American prisoners
of war keep faith with each othl'r and
nl'ither do nor say anything harmful to
f'ueh other and thf' provisions of the
191-9 Geneva Convention.
Take Command. Article 79 of the
Geneva Convention provides for recog·
nition or election of a Prisoner of War
Representative in all places where there
af(~ POW's. In officer camps and in
mixed camps (officers and other ranks)
the sl'nior officer wilJ he recognized as
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thC' POW Representative; in nonofficer
camps the prisoners shall elect by secret
ballot a POW Representative every 6
months from among themselves. An
officer will he stationed in each lahor
camp for the purpose of carrying out
the camp administration duties for
which tlH' POW's an' rC'sponsihl('. Tlw
POW's in the labor eamps llIay dect
th(' officer as their POW ReprC'scntative
hut are not requircd to do SO.18
Thcre appears to ('xist some conflict
hetween the Code and the Geneva Convention in situations wherehy in nonofficer and lahor camps the same prisoner of war may occupy the two positions of POW Heprcsentative and Smior in Command. In officer and mixed
camps the two positions will be occupi£'d hy the same individual.
TIIP prohh'lll whieh ('ould ('xist in Ihe
fortl1l'r sitllalion. and do('s ('xisl in th('
lall!'r. oC(,lIrs wll('l1 IInch'r IllI' Code all(\
ils illl)llc'Jl1('ntin~ regulations his com·
manel r('sponsihilitil's - enforCl.'Ill£'nt of
01(' Code and the duty to defeat till'
enemy - are paramount at all times;
yet, under the Geneva Convention his
responsibility to furthpr the welfare of
his fellow prisoners of war is paramount. Which duty shall prevail? In
that the President of the United States,
who promulgated the Code of Conduct,
is limited in his "ordinance-making"
power by the restriction that his rules
and regulations must not contravene a
statule nC'at£'d by Congr£'ss or the provisions of the Constitution. IhC' TrC'aty
(G£'neva Convention) must take prpced('I1('('. The PrC'sident's ExC'culiVt' Orc)('r
is suhordinate to the Geneva Convention requirpments wh£'n there is a conflict.)!!
In th£'ir r£'gulations impl£'menting
til£' Code of Conduct and describing
the nature of the training which should
he givt'n military personnel in the
Code, hoth the Secr£'taries of Defmse
and Army hav£' indicated that the

elected POW Representative system as
providN) for in ArticlC's 79·81 of the
Convention would he formed only if
the Senior in Command organization
(under Article IV, Code of Condlwt)
cannot he effected. This is in conflict
with the G£'n£'va Convention. Perhaps
it is intend£'d by the Departm£'ut of l)£,f£'nse to impose a dllty on military personnel to elect the senior POW as the
POW Repn·sentative in nonofficer
camps, since in officer and mixed camps
the senior officer will he the POW Representative in accordance with Article
78 of the Con\'ention. If this is the
case it would seem to conflict with the
r£'quirement for a free, secret election
requireo hy Article 79 (1) of the
Geneva Convention.

Obey Lawful Orders. There oo£'s
not se(,1ll to II(' ('onfliet 11('1\\'£'('Jl the'
Codl' and til(' C('n£'\';\ Convention on the
point of olwdi£'lIe(' to orders. Th£'rt, is
110 nl£'ans for the liC'l)ior to punh:h
pri~onerli of war who' rduse to obey his
lawrul orders; punishment, if appropriatl'. must await repatriation.
Article V of tbe Code of Conduct. Article 17 of the Geneva Conv£'ntion requires that, when questioned,
every prisoner of war must give only
his name. rank, service number, and
date of hirth; or failing that, equivalent
information. No physical or mental
torture or any other form of coercion
may lIe u!'Oed against th£' POW's to seCIII"I' from tIwlll any additional inforIllation.
Article 70 of the Convention requires
that every prisoner of war be permitt£'d, immediatdy upon capture or at
l£'ast within 1 week after arrival at
the POW camp, to send a Capture
Card to his family and to the Central
Prisoner of War Agency. The suggested
form of the Capture Card is prescribed
in Annex IV to the' Convention and
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provides for giving 13 items of information: name, power on which the
POW drprnds, first name of father,
datr of hirth, place of birth,. rank,
service numher, address of next. of kin,
when taken prisoner, health status,
prrsent address, and date. Prisoners of
war may, if they so choos(', complete
only the name, rank, service number,
and date of birth portion of the card.
Beyond name, rank, service number,
and date of hirth, the prisoners go on
at risk of future court-martial upon repatriation. The words, "to the utmost
of my ability," indicate the limit to
which he must go before he may avoid
criminal liahility for giving information helpful to the enemy. He will have
10 show that any harmful or useful information he gave, allegedly involuntarily_ was caused hy a well-grounded
app,'('hmsion of immrdial(' and impl',\(lin~ (It'alh or of imnH'diah" sl'rious.
hotlily harm in order to dl'fend successfully his actions on the ground of coercion or duress.

of clarifying remarks specifically excmpting the Capture Card from Article
V restrictions or permitting its partial
completion and failure to discuss personal correspondence. When restricted
to the four permissible items of name,
rank, service number, and date of birth,
the POW is in effect denied use of the
Capture Card-for he must address it fQr
mailing.
A similar conflict arises concerning
the private correspondence the POW
is privileged to engage in under Article 71 of the Convention. Such correspondenc(' is subject to censorship by .
the detaining powl'r, thus providing the
enemy with names and addrrss('s of
family and friends, personal information, etc. Neither the Code itself nor
tIll' Department of De£l'ns(' and individual S('rvicI' Instructions promulgating
Ihl' Codl' provide ~uidance in this arl'a,
TIll' I'on/lict~ I1l'tw('rll thr Cod!' of
Conduct and thl' Gl'nrYa Conwlltion of
1949 which hav(' hr('n discussl'd aris('
('ssentially from the humanitarian pur-

There is nothing in the Geneva Conwntion drsigned to promote disloyalty
among the prisoners of war or to require a prisoner to hr disloyal to the
country in whose armed forces he was
serving at the time of capture.
The requirements of the Code that
answers to questions put to a prisoner
by the detaining power must be limited
to name, rank, service number, and
date of hirth, that the POW must evade
answering furth('r qurstions to the utmost of his ability, and that the POW
must not make oral or writtrn statements disloyal or harmful to his country, its allies, or his comrades need not
conflict with the provisions of the
Geneva Convention.
Some conflict may arise from the application of the Code restraints to usc
oC the Capture Card and personal corr('spondence of the captive to the outside. Conflict may arise from omission

pose of the Convention and the assumption therein that the prisoner of war is
no longer a danger to the enemy because he is removed from the fight, and
the directly contrary instructions contained in the Department of Defense
Directive 1300.7 of 8 July 1964 implementing the Code that directs the
American soldier to continue the battle
in the prisoner-of-war camp and physically defeat the enemy even there. The
Code of Conduct need not be and
should not be interpreted in a manner
inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. as is stated in JAGW 1961/1140,
23 June 1961: "It was not intended
that the Code of Conduct contravene
thl' provisions of the Geneva Conv('l1tions." The conflicts, such as they are,
can he r('movcd easily by issuing certain qualifications to a few absolute
instructions contained in the implementing departmental regulations.
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IV -THE CODE AND
THE MAN
It has been said that "the misconduct
of a minority in Korea, made it necessary to set down in specific words a
Code of Conduct which had ther!'tofore
l)('{'n traditional with mosL Unit<·d
States military men."l Many of the
lesser failures of Ame-rican captives
oc-curred I)('e-ause they didn't know
what was really e-xpected of them in the
prison camp environment. To face the
enemy on the hattIe field was one thing,
hut to meet him face to face in an interrogation room was something else.
The Korean war had three aspects.
The-re was the civil war aspect - North
Koreans fighting South Koreans for
('ontrol of a divided country. Then'
was the collcctive- a~pe-ct - t'J(' fir"t
lilliit'd Nations attempt to ;top a
treaty-hreaking aggm::sor. And finally,
th{'re was the cold war aspect - the
West!'rn Powers blocking the expansion of Communist imperialism.!! This
was the first war in whie-h America as
a whole met its enemy - totalitarian
communism. For it was not just young
soldiers who faced the antagonist. but
the entire cultural pattern from which
th!'y had come.
The causes of the war, United Nations objectives, and the need for
American response were not clearly
delineated in the public mind. This lack
of under"tanding prevailed among the
civilian populace as well as within military ranks. It might hr that tllC're
existed a Be-cd for better coordination
between the military, civilian educational institutions, churches, and patriotic organizations to provid!' U.S. se-rv·
ice personnel with a better understanding of the American ideals. The young
man who, upon entry into the mTlitary
service, has not been taught pride in
country and self and a sense of honor
and duty must be accepted on those

terms. The man cannot be completely
made over, even if the services had the
time.
As everyone knows, 21 of the Amt'ricans captured during the Korean war
decided to remain with the enemy the only time in history that American
captives have chosen not to return
home because they preferred the enemy's form of government to their own. 3
This action, of course, was all the more
astonishing because the enemy's form
of government was so unlike our own.
Could it have hcen that they really
didn't know enough about their own
government? Possibly somewhere in
the past someone failed them by not
adequately instilling within them that
pride of country for which, in the past,
so many have died.
TIl<' Code of Conduct's high standards we-re- ~et forth as guides for
Americans in uniform. Backed by adl~
quate training and education, they are
to support the assurance of Armed
Forc{'s leade-rs that American fighting
Jllen will Ill' fully pr;'pared to meet the
ene-my on any front and under any conditions.
In Korea tIl(' United State-s hac1 fini~IJ('d a war with an l'lll'my who fought
not only on the- hattlefie-id hut in prison
e-amps as well hy manipulating the
minds of the prisoners. The U.S. Gov{'mme-nt and military establishment
had come to sec that U.S. servitx'me-n
not only had to be trained how to fight
phy"ically, hut they had to know how
to fight back me-ntally lind morally M
well.
The Communists looked upon a pris:
on('r in their hands as slave lahor and
as a tool of propaganda warfare-. 4 One
ve"rification is the following, which was
presented hy William E. Mayer, a U.S.
Army psychiatrist, in a spe('ch reproduced by Baylor Univ('rsity, Waco,
Texas, in 1957. The document, ohviolls~
Iy communistic, is not presented here

363
as an endorsement but merely for consideration and the fact that it contributes to the understanding of the ap"
proaches that thr. Communists used in
thl'i'r handling of the Amerie~m prisoners in Korea. It comes from a message:
writtl'n hy the Chil'f of Intl'IJigl'nce: of
the Chil1l'sl' PI'oples Volunteers in
North Korea to Chief of Intelligence: of
Chinese Peoples Republic in Peiping,
and the message - the original one
that was intercepted was entitled, "An
EvallJation of the American Soldiers"litr.rally translated, rl'ads as follows:
Based IIpon our observations of the
American soldiers and their officers
captured in this war for the liberation
of Korea from the capitalist-impe·
rialist aggression, some facts arc evi·
dlmt. The American soldier has weak
loyalties - to his family, his community, his country, his religion, and
to his f('lIow ~oldil'r. J1i~ ('onccpt of
right nud wronl! is hn7.Y. III! is hnsicn!ly materialistic, and he is an op·
portunist. By himself he feels insecure and frightened. He underestimates his own work and his strength
and his ability to survive. lIe is ignorant of social values, social conflicts, and tensions. There is little or
no knowledge or understanding even
among American university graduates
of U.S, political history and philosophy; the federal, state, and community organization; states and civil
rights, freedom safeguards; and how
thcse allegedly operate within his own
decndent system.
He is exceedingly insular and provincia! with little or no idea of the
problems and the aims of what he
contemptuously describes as foreigners
and their countries, He has an unrealistic concept of America's external
and inherent, rather than earned or
proved, superiority and absolute military invinl'ibility. He fails to appreriate the meaning of nnd the nece~
~ity for military orgnnization or any
form of discipline. ]\[ost often he
appears to feel that his military service is a hateful, unavoidable servitude to be tolerated as briefly as
possible and then escaped from as
rapidly as possible or he is whnt they
themselves call a "peacl'lime soldier"
who sees it only as a soft and a safe

joh. Both of those types resent hardship and sacrifice of any description
as if these things were unreasonable
and unfair to them personally.
Based upon the above facts about
the imperialist United States agl!ressors, the re('ducatiQn and indoctrination program for American prisoners
proceeds as planned.s

This was'the enemy we were fighting
in Korea; this is the enemy we are
fighting in Southeast Asia; and this,
in all probahility, will he our enemy in
future conflicts. It is a truism that no
nation can expect to survive unless it
knows the nature of its enemy and
unless it maintains both the moral and
physical strength to defend itsdf
against him. We know our Communist
enemy and we will not be caught short.
A nation cannot guarantee survival
10 Jllel11lll'rs of IH'r Arllll'cl Forl't's, l'illH'r
in ('ol11hal or I'aplidly, anti Anll'ril':1II
fi~hlin!! IlIl'n clon'l :Isk fM slll'h a 1!1I:trantee - Ihey ask only for a fightin/!
chanre. The Armed Forces Codl' of
Conduct was written for men of conscience: and good faith - to help give
tlwm that fighting chance. G
Secretary' Wilson's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, drafters of
the Code, unanimously agreed that the
military services should institute a two,
fold training program to insure its
maximum dissemination and to assist
in preparing our fighting men for any
contingency.7 The President of the
United States contributed further when
he stated in promulgating the Code of
Conduct:
No American prisoner of war will
be forgotten by the United States.
Every availahle m!'ans will be employed by our Con'mlllent to !'stnblish
I'onta('t with, to ~upport and to obtain
the re!casl! of all our prisoncrs of
war. Furthermore, the laws of the
United States provide for the support
and care of dept'ndents of members
of the armed for('cs induding those
who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of su('h prisoners
that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare,S
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Thus we have scm evidence that indoctrination and training in the Code
of Conduct for all military personnel
is considered an important and valuahle phasl". The Committee madc such
'a recommendation to the President,
who in tllrn ill his Ex('clltivl' Ord(')'
stakd in part,
. . . that every member of the
Armf'd Forces is expected to ml'asurc
up to the standards ('mhodied in the
Code and that in order to achieve
these standards, each mcmher of the
Armed Forces liable to capture
should he provided with specific trainin/! and instructions designed to hetter
equip him to counter and undl'rsland
all enemy efforts against him, and
should he fully instructed as to the
Ilt'havior and ohli/!ations expected of
him durin/! com hat or captivity.9

TI\(' S('CTl'tary of ndl'n~l'. in lurn.
pronllll)!ah'Ii a 1l11'1l1111'antl1ll1l Itl lIlt'
~l'('rl'laril's of Ill<' ~lilila)'r \)1'\1:11'11lI('nt~, duted 18 August 1955, to pro"ilil' Ihl'm wiLh further guidance. This
memorandum was cancelled by DOD
Dir{'ctivc No. 1300,7, dated 8 July
1961·, which estahlishes current policies
and proecdures and provides basic
guidance for the development and execution of training, including instructional material, in furtherance of the
aims and objectivl"s of the Code of
Conduct for memhers of the Armed
Forcl"s,10 Further, thc objectives of the
Dirl'ctive were to insure that:
A. The Military Departments maintain energctic, uniform, and continuing
training programs in behalf of the
Code of Conduct, including training
when-hy individuals arc taught to resist under the varying degrees of hostilt> interrogation.
B. All training programs in support
of the Code of Conduct inculcate in
each member of the Armed Forces:
1. A clear and uniform understanding of his ohligations, responsibilities,
and thl' hehavior expected of him in
comhat or captivity.

2. A .positive and unswerving belief
in and devotion to the spirit and letter
of the Code of Conduct, and the
recognition that the Code is a binding
military obligation.
3. An unqualified determination
and helief in his ability to oppose and
defl'at physi.cally, mentally, and morally all en {'my elIorts against him, his fellow servicemen, and his country during
pl'acetime. ('omhat, or captivity.
iI·. A confidence in his ability to
deny information and to resist enemy
interrogation, exploitation and indoctrination,
C. Therc is a consistency in all Departillent of J)efens(' Code of CondlH,t
training programs and training materials.]1
lIpon r('('('ipt of this I!lIidane('. each
of Ill<' military ":I'I'rl'laril''': Ihen pwnllll.
:rUh'" in~ln\l'li(ln,.: 10 Ihl'ir 1'I':,p",'liw
:'I'r\"i('!':'. It is my inh'nlion to ('m'l')'
hri('Oy and in part. only'th(' Air Forc!'
uncI the Navy uc,tion along with s('v('ral
n-commendations provided for Army
aviation personnel. In this manner full
duplication will he avoided, yet some
idea as to the practices and procedures
of the R('rvices will be presented.
Air Force. All commands instituted
a three phase training plan to include
at least 10 hours of training a year in
support of the Code. 12 All members
re('{'ive a general hriefing on the Code
and national policies under phase one
which covers five.major areas:
1. The Code and its purpose and
meaning.
2. Resistance to enemy political and
economic indoctrination. This calls for
training in. "basic truths and advanlage~ of our democratic institutions as
opposed to the fallacies of communism."
3. National, service, and unit histories and traditions.
tl .. Motivations of individuals toward
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national aims ~'as opposed to those of
the enemy."
5. Character guidance and encouragement of religious beliefs.
Phase two, a more specific form of
survival and prisoner indoctrination, is
givl'n mainly to crewm('n vulncrahl(' to
c:apture. It is patt('rned along the lin('s
of the survival school at Stea!l AFB,
Nevada, where fighting men get the
unvarnisIwc1 truth ahout POW treatnWllt Crom those who kllow - the ex·
POW's thems('lves. 1 :l The third phase
of training is for specialized personnel
and includes classified intelligence subjects.
Of the minimum 10 hours of annual
Cooe training, 2 hours should he dedicat('o to the Code itself, its purpose
and meanin~, with other sessions de"oll'd 10 ollwr Sllhj('!'ls.
Nm'y. Bun'all oC N:n'al Pl'r~llnJl(·1
Inl'lrul,tion IGlO.9C of 22 S('ptelllh('r
1961" /Jurrau. 0/ Naval Personnel Manual. NAVPERS 15791A, revised 1959,
ancl lIlIitcd Statrs Navy Regulatiolls.
19'18 provide the current guidanc!',
n·lativc to the Code of Conduct, for
Ill!' naval service.
The Rurean 0/ Naval Personnel Manual statl'S in part that" ... thl' training
and education program of each command shall in!'lude instruction in the
Cooe of Conduct and shall he design!'<1
10 presl'nt a clear realization to thc
s!'rvicl'man that the full and loyal ohs('rvance of the spirit and letter of the
Code is in the hest interest of the
Nalion, the Naval Service, his shipmaIl'S. and himself."
For enlisted personnel, when the
Cooe has b('en explained for the first
tillll'. an appropriate l'ntry shall be
made on the Administrative Remarks
page of the Enlisted Service R('cord. 14
Navy Regulatiolls states in part that
"thl' Codl' of Conduct shall be carefully explaitwd to each Navy enlisted person":

1. Within 6 days of his initial enlistment.
2. Aftcr completion of 6 months' active service.
3. Upon the occasion of each reenlistment.
Instruction in the Code shall he inciud('d in th!' training and cducational
program of the command, and a t('xt
of the COOf' of Conduct shall he posted
in a conspis;uous pIacl', or places, readily accessible to the personnel of the.
command. l5
Bureau. 0/ Personnel Instruction
1610.9C's purpose is to insure that
training programs incorporat(' policies
and pro'cedurl's for trainin~ in the
Code of Conduct. Paraphrased. it statl's
in part that !'ommandin:r officl'rs will
prm'idl' ('duration and traininf!' in till'
Codl' to ronform wilh p:uidat)('1' proyidrd hy lilt' Ikparlnll'1l1 of ])('[('11:«'.
Inslruction and nppliration of th(' Coo('
will \)(' ('ff('rtivelr illcillcl('d as an ill\('gral part of a Command Leadl'rship
Training Program. That for technical
training, two hours outside the normal
work week shall be devoted to material
presentation. During recruit training this
instruction shall be given during normal
instruction time.! 6
The following recommendations are
thos~ given to assist Army aviation personnel to withstand encroachmen.t of
Communist psychology. They were
madl' in November 1948, several
months before the outbreak of hostiliti('s in Korea, and are based upon personal experiences of a field grade offi("l'r in a Japanl'se prisoner-of-war comJlound and arc still considered valid,11
1n part, they are:
1. POW survival should be studied
just as thoroughly as arctic and jungle
survival.
2. Physical training of the combat
troops should be greatly intensified the soldier should be at his best, mentally and physically, at time of capture.
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3. The e-ducation and indoctrination
program should give a true picture of
the enemy's treatment of prisoners; "to
b(' forewarned is to be forearmed."
4. A study of the psychology of the
l'lle-my's treatment of POW's should be
k('pt up-to.date through all intellig(,llce
~ollrce-s.

5. Discipline of the mind, physical
adaptahility, and flexihle- hehavior patterns should he strongly stressed in
training periods.
6. Ex-POW's could assist in briefings be-fore missions by presenting
hdpful hints from personal experiences
such as proper clothing, food, how to
avoid breaking security, and importanc(' of a hobby.
As a part of a r('sistance training
prop.ram_ troops should he- tau~ht Ihe"l'l'l"ifil" way" in whil"h ;It'!" of p:ulil'ipalion aid Ihe (,lll'IIlY'~ propaganciistic
eaus(' and endange-r the s('curity of the
United 'Stale-s. Enemy p~ychological
warfan' laelics should Ill' undl'n,lood hy
our soldiers in the context of the Communists' hroad strate-p:y of exte-rnal
warfar('. Finally, tl1<' POW should 1)('
taught th(' skills r('quin'd to activat('
and 0lwrale covert resistance organizations in int('rnnwnt and how to ('sea pc
the captor and survive under difficult
condi tions.lR

v - COUNTERCHARGE
In the years following the Ame-rican
Revolution vast confusion of thought
as to what was re-quired to in~ure the
survival of the American way of life
exist('d. Some argu('d that the military
shoulrl he e-Iiminated altogether, while
othc-rs such as Thomas Jeff('rson, one
of the grc'at architerts of d('mocracy,
warned: "\Ve must train and c1assi fy
the whole of our male citizens and
make military instruction a regular
part of collegiate education. We can
nev('r 1)(' safe until this is done."l

The military way is a long, hard
road r('qlliring the maximum from
each individual - in tim('s of war the
demands are even higher. If nothing
hut fear of punishm('nt was dep('nded
upon to hold me-n to the Iinr during
cxtrrm(' trial, the r('suits in all probability would he wholesale mutiny ancI
a situation well he-yolICI the conlrol of
adequate and qualifiecIll'acIcrship. Srlr~aerifice and a ~uprrme devotion to
dUly arl' II\(' prime ingreclirnts of thr
d('clicat('d professional.
Much controversy and much debat('
have been generat('cl regarding the conduct of the American fighting man in
Korea. When the first prisoners of war
were taken hy the Communist forers,
ther imml'diatrly hecamr til(' suhjert
of an intl'nsi\'e C:ommunist propaganda
campaign. During thl' war itsrlf thl'
I'ontro\'l'rsy inen'a"l'.! in inte-n,.:ity. un·
IiI. ('wn t ually. prisO\\('r i":":I\('s hl'I'a III I'
thl' profl'ssrd ":;tumhling hlorks" in th('
lonp:-drawn.out truce'talks, delaying its
t('rmination. 2
Upon repatriation, the 4,4,28 Americans who surviv('d the enemy prison
camps he-cam(' thr suhjects of another
type of propaganda - propaganda hy
Aml'ricans, about Americans, directed
to Amerieans. 3 Reports were circulated,
as has hren previously noted in this
pape-r, that as many as one of seven
American prisoners collaborated with
till' rnemy, betrayed their buddies,
signed self.incriminating statements or
statrments that incriminated their
Gov('rnment. The widespread publicity
giV('n to r('ports of this nature and
the wide dissemination of the view that
the Korean events are conclusive d('monstrations of social decay in Amcri·
e-an socirty have not gone compl('tdy
l1nehalI('ngl'd. It is intcnde-d that this
chapt('r will pr('srnt a portion of those
challenges as the challengers in turn
make the-ir c·ol111terc:harg('. Tn doing so
they farr no simple task, as those who
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attempted to correct disorted interpretations of the events in Korea encountrrrd a numher of grrat difficulties,
particularly whrn they wished to do so
within the format aIIowrd hy masscirculation media. 4 No scholarly history of thr events of the Korean
rpisode was preparrd: Government sP.('mity rl'gulations pT<W('nlf!el aeel'ss to
Ilw hasic somees hy non-government
sl'holars anel hy many within the
~OVI'T11I11I'nt who are intefl'~ll'd hut diel
not POSSl'SS a "nerd to know."
An examination will be made of the
grnrral characteristics of those who
wrrr classified upon repatriation as
rither resistors, collaborators or middle groun(l personnel in an attempt to
elisrovrr a common denominator. Finally. Ih(' idras of some as to why. our
pl'r~(l1ln('1 in C:ommunist prison enmps
lwrrllrtlll'll :1:< tlll'Y lli,1 will Ill' "i,'w"d
in a l'nn:<lrm'liw alii! "xlt'nllalin~ m:\IlIll'r.
Wrll ovrr a hundred separate scienlific studi('s of prisoner behavior in
those camps have been conducted, and
it ("an hr d('finitely stated that U.S.
personnd in Korean prison camps behaved as well as military men have
acted in any war in which this country
has engaged - drspite the fact that
they were subjected to treatment never
experienced in any other war.5 Of the
7,190 Americans taken prisoner over
90 percent were taken during the first
12 months of the conflict, and most of
those remained until hostilities ceased
about 3 y('ars later. G No on~ will deny
that 3 years should be more than
adequate to separate the men from the
boys. By any yardstick, in the Korean
struggle - the first armed clash with
communism - U.S. prisoners were
treated in a manner heretofore unknown. More than a fifth of returnees
were, in spite of the fattening period
just prior to r('patriation, diagnosed as
suffering from malnutrition. The average weight loss in captivity was 21

pounds, and some 257 of them had lost
I{.O pounds or more. 7 Malnutrition posed
a greater threat than starvation. Most
POW deaths were caused by lack of
proteins, minerals_ or vitamins rather
than hy caloric d('ficiencies. 8
Th(' first ordral a prisoner had to
sufTl'r - and p('rhaps tlw worst - was
the march from thr place of captur('
to one of the prison camps. The marching prisoners were b('atrn and kickc·d.
A numher of the North Korean offic('rl"
w('re hullwhip harbarians: products of
a semiprimitive rnvironment. On one
of th(' so-callrd death marches, 700
men were head('d north, hut bdor(' tlw
camp was rpached 500 men had
p(,rished.!l Upon arnvmg at till'
prisoner-of-war camp the survivors
\\'('r(' put through a starvation period
(b:i~n('d 10 kill th(' w('ak and Iht'
\\'oulllj('d. It i!'n't trill' Ihat Ill!' COI1\I1\Unist!' wanl to eonycrt IllI' wl'ak('!'t nl!'n,
Th('y \\'ant only thosr of Ihe stron~('sl
will. hrli('\'inp: thry will makr th(' 1)(':"'1
Communists. 10
The Communist eapLors viewed the
prisoner primarily as a rich source of
potent propaganda material. By means
of a h('avy barrage of indoctrination,
th('y attempted to convert American
prisoners of war Lo communism. This
is horne out hy these Iacts: 97 percent
of the r('turned POW's were subjected
to enemy indoctrination during internment, and virtually all received some
form of an indoctrination lecture; 83
percent were required to attend group
study periods; 43 percent attended
smaller discussion groups and conferencrs while 27 pprcent attended public
p:athrrings rallrd hy the captor. l1 The
O\'('rriding theme stm;sed in indoctrination was the social and economic
m('rits of communism as against the
"sins" of American capitalism.
To carry out this program of POW
exploitation the Communists used three
major techniques: 12
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Rewards and Punishments - a system which played upon the natural
tendency to seek pleasures and avoid
pain.
Divide and Conquer - a system
which denied the prisoners normal
sources of leadership and encouraged
divisiVl'lI(-sS and suspicion amon~ them.
[d(-a EnvirolUllent - a strictly controlled environment with no friendly
news sources (radios, newspapers, let·
ters) coupled with a heavy diet of
Communist news.
Interrogation was hoth verbal and
writtl-n, with approximately GO percent
hcinp: verhaJ.13 Autohiographies wenrl'quin-d and completed hy 91 percent
of all the POW's in Korea. Thirty nine
percent admitted signing propaganda
petitiollS. H As one POW stated in part
II1'0n n-palrialion:
I dis,'o\"-f(-d how ..as\' it was to
,'onu- out on the I05in~ (-I;d of a hatll!'
of wits with till' interrogator. They
had all the admntage5. plus being
highly trained in the art of interroga·
tion, and I had only heen' given a few
hours training in how to resist ... I
was reasonably sure my interrogator
already knew the answers to most of
the questions which I refused to answer, but this was part of their tech·
nique to further confuse and baffle
me. IS

This POW was forced to stand con·
tinuously for 154 hours, more than 61h
days, and was under interrogation for
over 60 hours, having slept less than 1
hour in almost a week.16 He had spent
222 days in solitary confinement. 17
The real tragedy of the American
prisoners in Korea who gave comfort
to the enemy is not what they did
under pressure hut the fact that they
were totaIIy unprepared for that pressure. The best prepared, frontline
soldier is helpless unless he knows what
he is fighting for. The most vulnerable
prisoners lacked moral convictions and
a sense of their own inherent dignity.
They had gone to war without realizing

the importance of the conflict and had
marched off to prison without knowing
they were still at war. An Air Forceestablished hoard of general officers
who reviewed the case of 83 officers and
airmen who had made false confessions
or who were accused of collaboration
stated: "that the briefing and indoc·
trination given U.S. combat personnel
as to their conduct as prisoners of war
was inadequate and confusing."1s
Gen. John E. Hull, U.S. Army,
(Ret.), commander of the forces in the
Far East during the Korean war and
an acting Chairman of the Defense
Committee which wrote the Code,
st.ated further:
I feel strongly that we are derelict
in our schools in teaching the youth
of this nation enough ahout what we
5tand for and what rommunism stands
for. I have a very firm helief that the
youth of this nation, if they fully
understood the Communist system,
would never question our system, But
I do think that Communist soldiers
are much more fully indoctrinated
than ours are. The schools have a
responsibility here. When an American
youth enters the military service he
should know what his country stands
for. The services should not be called
upon to teach it to him. 19

The Senate Permal1ent Investigating
S\lbcommittee, which had been studying Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation of American
military and civilian prisoners, stated
that: "the military Services are to be
criticized for not having fully adapted
their training programs to prepare
troops for the problems encountered in
Chine:;e Communist prison eamps during the Korean war."20 The Committee
noted, however. that the Chinese Communists and North Koreans violated
numerous articles of the Geneva Conventions by "their use of isolation techniques, their shackling of prisoner~,
their exposure of prisoners to the
curiosity of the local populace, their
inadequate medical attention, poor
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clothing, gross inadequacy of foods,
improper hospital facilities, the inadequacy of Chinese doctors, and physical mistreatment of American prisoners."~l

The resistance of the American prisoner of war to Communist methods of
indoctrination is disclosed in one captured Chinese document which states:
"It will take more than indoctrination
schools to persuade most Americans
that" their way of life is not better than
any other."22 The variation in response
to Communist pressure and indoctrination was extreme. The ground force,
captured early in the conflict, who
seemed to come from units that had
not developed high social cohesion and
who suffered extensive mistreatment
after capture apparently supplied most
of thl' collahorators. The Korean conflict would indicate that the troops werc
not preparl'd or trained for the type of
POW situation to which they were exJloscd. 2a
The Kor{'an war was the first war
in American history, except perhaps
for the Indian struggles, which was
not a crusade. 24 At the beginning of
thl' war the U.S. Army was inexperienced. The units pulled suddenly out
of the soft life of occupied Japan
and thrown into a fight against a more
numerous foe found the going tough.
The first U.S. troops "to reach Korea
were the 406 men of Task Force Smith,
approximately half a battalion of the
21st Infantry Regiment (two infantry
companies and one battery of artillery)
of the 24th U.S. Infantry Division,
which arrived on 1 July 1950. 2(; Ele·
ments of the 34th Infantry arrived at
Pusan 011 2 July 1950 with a ('ontitlllcd
increase in the U.S. personnel commitments thereafter. 2G By the spring of
1951 the 8th Army had been rebuilt
into a tough, battle·experienced fighting force. 27
The rotation policy of the Korean

conflict contributed to the poor acceptance of the war by the .U.S. troops.
In World War II soldiers were in for
the duration; they could only achicve
their personal goal of getting home
when the Government achieved its political goal of military victory. Rotation in Korea divorced these two areas
in that the aim of the majority was
merely to mdure 9 months at the front
and then get out. For the first time in
American history a major war was
being fought without adequate motivation both in Korea and the United
States. In May 1952, during the
Korean war, 83 percent of a cross section sample of 2,975 university stu·
dents were found by Cornell University
social scientists to be essentially negative toward their military service ob·
ligations. 28
There has he{'n almost unending
criticism of Korean prisoners of war
hecause they supposedly did not escape
from their Communist captors. This
"no escape" charge is qualified by
critics with the statement that there
were no escapes from "permanent prison camps." The use of this distinction
is important in that 647 men did escape
after being captured by the Communists, but before they "were interned
in the maximum security camps.2D The
escape record of American prisoners
in Korea has never been told in full
and probably never will be. The escape
record maintained during the hostilities, the identities of escapees, and
any details of their exploits were kept
secret.
Even greater obscurity surrounds unsuC'c{'ssful escapl's. About 4 percent of
all Army repatriates and 15 percl'nl
of the Air Force returnees told corroborated stories of having broken
out of the places at which they were
held by the Communists.3D
The experience and behavior of the
U.S. troops captured in Korea revealed
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a need for measures designed to offset
the enemy's planncd program of prisoner exploitation_ In preparing a program of indoctrination and training
which would provide an adequate defense against the Communists, in the
event of capture, an attempt was made
to determine the differences between
performances from the various services.
Military figures indicate that U.S.
military personnel with comparable
backgrounds and in comparable situations reacted almost identically regardless of branch of service_31
Upon repatriation the 3,323 Army
prisoners of war were placed into one
of three groups by Army researchers
who studied their personal histories and
camp conduct. The breakdown was as
follows: 32
Participators (IS percent) - Courtmartial and dishonorable discharge
cases plus those who would have fallen
in that category had they not been
discharged from the military service.
Middle (80 percent)-POW's about
whom the Army had compiled little or
no derogatory information or conflicting information.
Resistt'rs (50 percent) - POW's
decorated or recommended for decorations as a result of their meritorious hehavior in captivity plus those who had
committed at least two distinct acts
of resistance in internment and against
whom there was no derogatory information.
Of this group 579 middlemen and
IR8 resisters WNC screened in an attempt to determine common factors
which differentiated those POW's who
resisted exploitation from those who
participated in the enemy's program. A
sample was selected to reflcct the sault'
proportion of ranks, races, months of
military service, months in captivity,
and principal places of internment. The
following is a random sampling of

some differences between the three classified groups :33
1. Few significant differences in
hack ground were found between the
participators and the resisters. The
participators were of lower intelligence
than the resisters, and a higher proportion of the rcsisters had bcen decoratcd
prior to Korea.
2. Hesisters, bccause thcy yielchl
less readily, were interrogatcd morc extensively and intensively than were partic.ipators.
3. The participators received virtually all thc preferential treatment
givcn by the captor.
4. The resisters received most of the
pressure, ineluding threats and ahuses.
meted out hy the enemy.
5. Participators received more indoctrination than rcsisters.
6. The resisters showed more con("(,TIl and ("ompassion for thrir fellow
POW's than did participators.
7. The participators came back from
Korea in hettcr physical health than
resisters; psychologr~aIly, however, a
greater -numher of thc participators
came hark with neurotic symptoms.
8. MicIdlt'm('n were l("ss cducated,
less int('lligcnt, and "greencr" soldicrs
than either participators or resisters.
9. A smaller proportion of middlemen were married and they came into
the Army less frequently than their
fellow POW's with backgrounds in the
entertainment or athletic field.
10. Middlemcn got less of the captor"s r('wards.
Tlw Army POW's in Korea showed
a marked lack of esprit de corps, cohesiv('ness. and mutual concern. 34

1. Tl'n perc('nt oC the POW's infornll'd on 11 Cell ow POW at lrast once
durin~ internment.
2. Over a third of the POW's
showed little or no concern and com-
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)la~~iol1

for Iheir fpllow POW's in
intNnmpnt and only 13 percent showed
a strong concern.
3. Half of thc POW's never en·
couraged anothl'r POW to resist, and
only 10 percl'nt gave a great deal of
such pncouragement.
4. One·fourth of the returning
POW's report being aware of the outright mistreatment of prisoners by their
frllow POW's, indueling heatings resulting in d!'ath.
5. Only 16 percent of all POW's
w(~re affiliated with a prisoner camp
organization of any type during captivity.
The following arc some of the chararlt'ristics of Ihe Army POW's who
rt'lurned from Korra. 3 :;
1. Their a"erage age at cap Lure was
21 years.
2. The average POW had a ninth
;:trail(' ('Iluealion.
:t Fivl' p('rt:enl \\'('re ofii(:('\"s. :m ppr('I'llt wew noncommissioned offi(!('rs,
and 57 percent were enlisted men be- .
low tIl(' rank of sergeant.

4. Seventy-five percent were membprs of the Regular Army, 10 percent
w('re from thl' Enlistpd Rpsprw and
National Guard, and 15 percpnt were
draftees.
5. Eighty-five pprcent had over 3
years of military service.
6. Fifty percent had less than 1
month of foreign service prior to
Korea.
7. Eighty-four percent had no combat service prior to Korea.
8. One percent had been POW's before.
In summary, Army figures indicate
that there were 5 percent resisters, 80
percent middle ground and 15 percent
collahorators. Among officers they
found the middle ground shrunken below its 80 percent norm; most officers,
as would be expected in a leadership

group, vigorously took sides. 36 Among
men of long Army service, the middle
ground was low as more took active
sides - either to resist or to collaborate.
The record of Negro prisoners
Korea indicated that 2.5 percent resisted, while 21 percent collahoratl'd.37
Other prisoners pointed out the fact
that the Chinese spl'nt far more time
working on the Negroes, since Communists spent much time fomenting
race haired in non-Communist lands.
According to the figures of an Army
psychiatrist, two officers actively rpsisted for l'ach who collaborated, and
among regular Army enlisted men, one
collahorated for every resister, with
few in thc middlc-ground group.3S
Most significant were the differences
in physical condition. The resisters had
rl'cl'ived a highcr number of hatth\\'ounds while few of the collahorators
hall h('('n \\'Ollllded.:lfl
As 10 the oYl'ra)) coniluct of prisolll'rs of war in KOfl·a. a major finriinl!
of thp Bl'lldl'tspn Committee in its report to the Secrptary of Defl'IHw was
that the average serviceman shares the
gpneral attitudl's and values of the
Amprican puhlic of which hp is a part.
Thpn~ is little ('vidpncc to support thp
view expressed in some quarters that
the serviceman lacks an awareness of
the Communist threat. It was further
stated that the Committee subscribed in
full to the Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
which found that, "with notorious exceptions, the prisoner of war performed
in a manner which did credit to his
Service and his country."40
Over 87,000 U:S. -officers and men
received combat decorations for performance of duty above and beyond
the call of duty; 79, or about two and
.a half timl's as many as those proven
traitor, were awarded the highest

in
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honor the United States can bestow, the
C0I.1gres~ional Medal of Honor.41
The following tribute was paid hy
Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson
to five Marines decorated at a Penta·
gon ceremony on II January 1954. for
heroism in resisting tortures at the
hands of the Communists while held
prisoners of war when he stated in
part:
They returned as victors of one
of the strangest and most unequal en·
coun ters of the Korean conflict. As
prisoners of war, physically at the
mercy of their captors, they successfully frustrated the enemy's concerted
atte'mpts to obtain their collahoration
for his evil purpose'S. AithouAh tor·
tured, starved, and threatened with
death, they refused to participate ...
In doing so, they won a shining moral
vietory.42

Questionnaires to determine the
attitud(' of military profrssionals toward the Code of Conduct were compl('t('d hy ~tudent mcrnhers of the
Naval 'Varfare and Command and
Staff Classes of 1967, Naval War College. N('wport IU. Tlll'se students repr('~enl each of the military s('rvices.
C'ompris(' the top 25 percent in promotion potential of their respective
year groups, possess outstanding leadership qualities, and represent a vast
range of experience. They include
many former commanding officers.
Of 143 completed questionnaires,
125 students indicated that a need
exists for a Code of Conduct; 91 believed that the present Code of Conduct
fulfills that need, while 12 definitely
stated it did not; 83 stated that the
present Code leaves no doubt in their
mind as to what is expected of them
should they become prisoners of war,
and 32 indicated some doubt. A significant factor is that 49 of the 143
indicated that a need for improved
training or instruction in the Code
exists.

VI - CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Code of Conduct grew out of the
Korean war. Prisoner-of-war performance was the subject of much controversy, both during the fighting and
following the cease-fire agreement.
Numerous newspapers, magazines,
books, and official studies contributed
to the discussions in which such
charges as "one of three collaborated"
to the conclusion "that of 4,428 returnees, only 425 - about six percent
of the total prisoner population of
7,190 - could be suspected of misbehavior and of which only II were convicted by court-martiaL" The tragedy of the American prisoner in
Korea is not that he gave comfort to
the enemy under pressure but that he
was totally unprepared for what he
had to endure.
It is impossible to establish and corrohorate the true account of North
Korean prison camp happenings. However, considering the nature of the war
and the unprecedented tactics employed by the Communist captors,
Korean prisoners of war behaved no
worse than those in previous wars.
A Code of Conduct, properly instituted, can be a useful and worthwhile
controIIing device. Functioning as an
instructional vehicle, it can form the
focal point of a program designed to
"stress the importance of avoiding capture while outlining expected behavior
if it occurs." Further, it can provide
helpful guidance during periods of
extreme trial when the body is weak
and the mind falters.
The present Code of Conduct, as
promulgated by Executive Order Numher 10631 on 17 August 1955, fulfills
the requirements and is the workable
tool necessary to provide these ser,;ic('s. The Code was not intended to
replace the Geneva Conventions Rela-
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tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of
. War of August 12, 1949, but to render
additional support and to meet necessities when a detaining power, in fact,
does not accept the Geneva Conventions. In this light, however, the Code
and the Conventi.on are incompatible
and inconsistent in certain areas. These
areas are as follows:
1. Resistance - in that the Code
stresses "continued resistance by all
means available" while the Convention
provides "humane treatment at all
times." Carry the fight to the camp
but expect humane treatment in return?
2. Escape - as related to medical
personnel and chaplains, the Code's
requirement that they make every effort to escape and thus "desert" those
who need their medical and religious
services.
3. Parole - same application toward medical personnel and chaplains
"when necessary to attend POW's in
other hospitals, camps and labor detachments or when it contributes to the
health and well-being of a sick or
wounded prisoner" or to sick prisoners
who might he repatriated.
4. Take Command - situation
whereby one man acting as POW
Representative and as Senior in Command "is faced with separate requirements of action originating from the
Code and the Convention."
5. Name, Rank, Service Numher, Dale of Birth - conflicts with

the Convention's "Capture Card and
pers,?nal correspondence" privileges.
To better prepare the American serviceman for the conflict now existing
in Southeast Asia and for future Communist challenges, the following is
strongly recommended:
1. Increased efforts in military training, discipline, and esprit de corps.
2. Adequate and thorough indoctrination of alI individuals in the proper
methods and techniques to resist capture, evade, escape, and survive if captured.
3. Increase-the will to resist of every
individual through an intensive study
of Am!;rican delllocracy as compared
to Communist ideologies. Insure that
the fighting man understands' his
proud heritage.
4. An intensification in the inculcating of religious motivations to provide
the necessary weapons of faith and
courage.
5. Intensive training to improve and
maintain physical and mental endurance.
6. Insure an adequate understanding of individual rights and I privileges
as a captive, as pertains to international and military law.
7. That the Code of Conduct or its
amplifying directives/instructions he
revised to correct the incompatibilities
and inconsistencies with the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
8. That a renewed effort be made to
insure that Code of Conduct instruction
and training programs are established
and are being properly administered
by well-qualified personnel on a continuing basis.
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APPENDIX - QUESTIONNAIRES
CODE OF CONDUCT
From 143 questionnaires completed by Naval War College students of the Naval Warfare
and School of Command and Staff Class('s of 1967, three of the questions immediately pertinent
to the conclusions of this paper arc prl'.sented. The numbers in parenthesis indicate total
checking that particular answer.
1. Do you believe that a need exists for a Code of Conduct? (125) Yes, (18) No.
2. Do you believe that the pres(,nt Code of Conduct fulfills that need? (102) Yes, (18) No,
(15) N.A. (Not Applicable) (4) Partially, (4) Not Answered.
3. Does the present Code of Conduct leave any douht in your mind as to what is expected of
you, should you become a prisoner of war? (36) Yes, (l03) No, (4) Not Answered.
The following is a random sampling of some of the answers received from those who believe
that there is no need for a Code of Conduct:
"The essence of the Code is inherent in hasic Marine training with
emphasis on the individual Marine's responsibility to his fellow Marine •.."
"Not for the purpose and in the sensI: it now exists. Currently it is nothing
more than quasi·criminal statute originated for the purpose of prosccution
..." "It is a redundant Gode that merely mouths in a general way oaths of
office and pledges of allegiance that have existed for some time •••" "The
present Code is an inadequate attempt to correct a basic fault in American
education .. .'. "Loyalty to one's country is built through an understanding
and appreciation of the basic principles of that country, not simply signing
a pledge ..." "A man's conduct is a result of his character; written words
will not supply the deficiencies . . ." "Those who lack loyalty, patriotism,
or responsihility will not achieve these qualities by signing a piece of paper
that they have read and understood a Code . . ." "The present Code is
humiliating to the professional by its very existence .••" "It is a collection
of platitudes which a military fighting man should not have to carry around
on a card as a hip pocket reminder •.."
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